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Abstract— This paper introduces the results of an analysis of 
security threats based on 3D graphics interface abuse mainly in 
Windows operating systems. Basic security threats, which can 
greatly influence the functionality and security of an operating 
system, are introduced in this paper. Due to the specific nature of 
the operating systems architecture, the most vulnerable part are 
the third party drivers, which have access to the core mode. 
Different approaches of protecting drivers are described together 
with disadvantages of these solutions. Practical methods of 
attacks are discussed in detail and when relevant, program 
alterations are suggested to program designers. The goal of these 
suggestion is to minimize or to completely eliminate mentioned 
security threats, making 3D graphics interface more secure. 
 





Thanks to IT specialist paying extra attention to security, usual 
pathways for malicious code have lately been either fully 
closed or very difficult to discover. Standard security threats 
are the topic of many defense strategies and approaches, such 
as layout randomization, utilizing NX security, rights 
restrictions within the operating system, locking authorization, 
utilizing isolation on application level in the form of integrity 
level or in the form of utilizing a sandbox with operating 
system interface restrictions. 
For this reason, the focus of attackers shifts to other parts of 
the operating system, through which the attackers could break 
through the security measures and which are hard to secure at 
all. Generally, we are speaking about any random code in core 
mode, which can use any processor instruction and thus access 
any sources. Code of core mode can be divided into the core 
itself, drivers, and system services. The only part, in which the 
highest percentage of third party codes is present, are the 
drivers needed to ensure the functionality of hardware or 
specialized software and thus the highest probability of critical 
errors is to be expected. The fundamental problem of drivers 
lies in the fact that the outer code is divided from them by thin 
interface oriented on power and not prepared to be used as a 
security divider. An example of such drivers is graphic card 
drivers, libraries, and services associated with them. Although 
the part of core interface is accessible only as system calls, 
graphic cards and their drivers are a potential security threat. 
Standard drivers are hidden from potentially untrustworthy 
codes using several different interfaces, parameters and data 
are processed and validated by the system. Specifically altered 
driver using DMA channels providing direct access to the 
memory for reading and writing directly into physical memory 
is far more common than an attack aimed at general drivers. 
Such process can be both, an attack or a rootkit detection 
method. 
Unlike standard drivers, graphic drivers mostly utilize 
separate interface and they interpret and perform complete 
code given by a client application. The result of this is a 
significantly better visible area for an attacker, and because 
WebGL standard, enabling Javascript access to graphic 
interfaces in webpages, exists, potential attack does not 
require anything else than malicious code attached to a 
webpage, e.g. in the form of a compiled script.  
The aim of the paper is to investigate possible pathways to 
breeching system security and to suggest security methods 
which could be applied to graphic card drivers. 
 
II. DEFINITION OF PROBLEMS AND THEIR ANALYSIS  
 
Recently, several approaches to how to deal with security 
threats of general drivers exist, but almost all of them are 
dependent on using virtualization of the first type and a 
hypervisor as an isolated environment for monitoring and 
checking the drivers. 
First option, which is not using virtualization, is an 
approach described in [1], in which an adaptation of code 
instrumentation using a translation of binary code is 
suggested. This approach is primarily designed for operating 
systems based on a Linux core, which differs greatly from 
Windows in its implementation of core mode and services. 
Another problem is that this approach can be applied on a 
GPU code, as it is processed solely on a driver and afterwards 
by hardware and it is therefore not possible to prevent 
interference through the GPU. The last issue with this 
approach is the power demand of the graphic card and its 
influence on its performance.  
Next solution is utilizing full virtualization for DriverGuard 
(DG), as introduced in [2], in which one can use a lite version 
of a hypervisor to put the control code above the code of the 
controlled system, while the supervisor also has to be able to 
distinguish individual types of allocated memory so it is 
possible to distinguish the program part of memory from the 
data part. The principle lies in monitoring changes in the data 
area of the memory of the driver, so when DG accesses a page 
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of a secured area, it forces throwing an exception, resulting in 
stopping the code execution. Just like when using classic 
debug function, int 3, without the driver or the malicious code 
could recognize such action. DG then analyses the source of 
the access and based on the analysis, it either permits or denies 
access. 
Another group of solutions for this issue is virtualization of 
only selected components and drivers, as introduced in [3] as 
SILVER. Each object in core mode is encapsulated in its own 
virtualization with a common hypervisor. When accessing the 
particular objects or executing their code, the impossibility of 
direct modification of paging tables is used and instead, the 
tables itself are being switched between, and thus only a 
restricted view of the core memory with optional different 
permission for each object is possible. 
The solution introduced in [4] utilizes a hypervisor for 
monitoring writings into secured areas in memory and also 
forces the memory department with sensitive data structures 
from others, because it is not possible to efficiently use 
smaller allocation unit than the memory page, which is 
minimally 4kB on x86 processors, which would not permit 
using the assistance of memory unit of the processor. The first 
problem is the dependency on virtualization, which might not 
be available all the time, and without virtualization of I/O 
ports, it is not possible to deny the GPU access to secured 
memory efficiently. Another problem is the impossibility to 
secure data structures of drivers, mostly data drivers of the 
graphic card. 
The issue with abovementioned solutions is the non-zero 
effect on system performance and in case of graphic drivers; 
those solutions cannot be suitable for majority of users who 
demand the highest GPU performance. 
Besides the effect on the performance, possible 
incompatibilities with given hardware and the way of its 
utilization are an issue for general hypervisors, as the 
operation system itself has high requirements on 
virtualization. 
Virtualization security, such as SILVER, requires larger 
disadvantageous modification of the system, in order to 
execute necessary allocations of core objects and their 
allocation to individual virtualizations. A significant 
disadvantage is then noticeable effect on system performance, 
as it is necessary to have extensive code for memory 
administration, and each switch between objects, or between 
the user and the core modes, will be significantly more 
difficult. 
For all abovementioned solutions, there is one characteristic 
common disadvantage, because they require the system to 
support virtualization extension. For x86 an x86-64, exist two 
pairs of virtualization technologies. VT-X and VT-D by Intel 
and AMD-V and AMD-Vi by AMD. VT-X and AMD-V 
extensions provide basic support for virtualization and 
administration of a hypervisor, host system, and guest 
systems. The support consists of instructions administrating 
virtualized systems and possible extensions of system objects, 
such as extended page table (EPT) or advanced programmable 
interrupt controller virtualization (APICV). VT-D and AMD-
Vi are virtualization extensions that extend basic virtualization 
by support for virtualization of input-output sources. The aim 
is extending the isolation of the guest system from the 
viewpoint of working with hardware without noticeably 
affecting system performance, which would be cause by 
software emulation and hardware translation. These extensions 
offer the option to utilize memory addresses designated for 
direct memory access (DMA), routing interruptions, and 
supporting direct sending of interruptions from the virtualized 
devices to virtual processors. 
Another solution is DeviceGuard. It is a function 
implemented in the core of Windows 10 operating system, 
which uses virtualization to protect processes working with 
signatures, system processes and drivers of devices, from 
outer attacks. The disadvantage of the whole system are 
system requirements, as it is necessary to ensure correct 
implementation of UEFI firmware with the SecureBoot 
function, which verifies the integrity of booting up the system 
and Hyper-V virtualization, which requires both extensions, 
the VT-X and VT-D. 
In Windows 10, there are also Shielded VMs, running under 
Hyper-V, which contain restricted SKernel, which does not 
support any drivers, except for necessary minimum, and which 
enables to host sensitive system services, such as Local 
Security Authority (LSA) in such a way, that sensitive 
information contained in them are secured. It is mostly the 
security of logging information against an attack from an 
administrator account. 
In present days there is no solution that would deal with the 
issues of the security of graphic drivers and work with GPU 
without utilizing virtualization, negatives of which have been 
mentioned above. Most of the current work is focused on 
optimization of 3D rendering in mobile devices with no focus 
on enhancing security [5,6].  
 
III. SECURITY THREATS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS  
 
Among the main analyzed security threats and 
vulnerabilities belong Buffer over-flow, Timing attack, Object 
slicing, reading and underflow of character buffers, invalid 
indicator, Use-after-free, Out-of-memory, and Malformed 
input data. Each security threat was assessed based on its 
significance and the possibility of redress. 
 
A. Buffer Overflow 
It is a standard error, during which the code writes behind 
the border defined as the area of the memory. This way, the 
attacker may in some cases rewrite the data structure, in which 
the given buffer is located. 
The main aim when abusing this error, is rewriting 
indicators in such a way that they would link to a memory 
under the attacker's influence, or which contains content 
provided by the attacker and with a known address. The 
content is then a machine code, which can attempt to abuse 
other vulnerabilities to gain higher permissions or to execute 
target activity. This flaw and this particular way of abuse for 
user code throws an exception, as the access memory is solely 
in pages with prohibited code execution. This restriction is 
present since Windows XP Service Pack 2 and it primary uses 
one of the free bits in the description of a page labeling 
restrictions. The processor supporting this function throws a 
special exception, which then terminates the process. 
This measure cannot be applied by default drivers in the 
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core mode, as an exception will cause fast system termination, 
because at that moment, there is no guarantee for any non-
standard exception that structures and allocated memory for 
the core mode are not damaged. The drivers thus must 
explicitly call for such labelled memory and this option is 
available since Windows 8. 
Attack alternative to the previous one is the rewrite of the 
NULL ending character by a random byte, and abuse of 
incorrect work with standard functions for working with 
strings in C language, which use the NULL character to 
determine the end of the string. In such case, the error cause 
the possibility to read the memory behind the character string 
and it enables possible data leak or getting information 
necessary for subsequent attacks. Alternatively, the memory 
can be rewritten by the following code and thus cause a buffer 
overflow with the safe effect: 
 
Void VulnerableFunction (wchar_t 
*buffer,int cbLength) 
{ 






B. Timing Attack 
It is a class of errors in code, when the function does not 
validate the input from the calling code correctly, or it 
validates it prematurely, and the attacker then can, thanks to 
more core processes, change parameters from a different 
thread and bypass authentication code, as depicted on Figure 
1. 
The basic assumption is that the function takes over one of 
the input parameter, object indicator, basic parameters of 
which can be altered parallel in a different thread. The aim of 
the attack is to cause buffer overflow or another error, e.g. a 
free indicator. The most significant disadvantage of such an 
attack is an inherent dependency on a programming error, 
when the access to a given object from more threads is not 
treated correctly and race conditioned, and depending on many 
factors, such as sequencing threads for performance or system 
activity of the core, the attacker's thread can but does not have 
to have the window to parallel manipulation with an object. 
Standard security for such kind of attacks is validating 
borders of array for every iteration or disablement of the 
internal structure of an object for an outer code and forcing 
access through methods, which force synchronization through 
threads or which fill in missing synchronizations. 
The disadvantage of such defense is the necessity to 
validate the buffer for every iteration. Because modern 
processors possess high efficiency of branching predictor, but 
that means at least several instructions more. In addition, such 
solution will prevent any code vectorization, i.e. utilization of 
specialized instructions for parallel processing of several 
elements at once. In the case of AVX extension for 
instructional set x86/x64, the number of elements can be as 
high as 8 elements for one instruction. In other cases, the 
condition requires performing functions that are more complex 
and thus reaching further loss of performance.  
Locking the memory page belongs among the suggested 
methods of security dealing with timing attacks. With buffers 
it is possible to force allocation in individual pages and it is 
also possible to change page security before validation from 
read/write to "read only" using the VirtualProtect function, 
which instructs the memory administrator to make changes to 
memory attributes concerning security of pages containing the 
given extent defined by an address and size. Subsequently, a 
copy from memory allocated by the user is made into the 
memory controlled by runtime or a driver. If it is not possible 
to ensure the use of an allocator, which uses separate pages for 
allocation, it is then possible to introduce change of memory 
administration, which will enable to lock the heap, in which 









Function call (buffer pointer)
 
Figure 1: Timing attack 
 
Another possible solution is strict access synchronization. 
With objects of graphic interface, it is possible to rather easily 
ensure complete access synchronization. To achieve 
scalability, it is possible to utilize Slim Reader/Writer (SRW) 
stamps, which were located in individual public methods. An 
alternative to access synchronization is attribute locking, i.e. 
introducing a type bool variable, which will deactivate codes 
of other methods for the given instance of the object after 
calling an executive method.  
We recommend to switch from C code to a C++ code and to 
utilize STL (standard template library), which allows to use 
iterators to check the extent. 
 
C. Object Slicing  
This security issue occurs primarily in object-oriented 
languages, in which a class can extend the definition of a 
superior class by another attribute and then during transferring 
the object to a function, which expects a superior class, the 
object can have the added attributes trimmed. With indicators, 
the trim itself is not realized, but methods which will be called 
and which will belong to the superior class, will not know 
about other attributes. If one or more methods were deployed 
within an inferior class, they will behave according to the new 
code and subsequently perform incorrect functions, or they 
will lead to a security flaw.  
The same problem applies to the procedural C language, in 
which the code can define several structures with a common 
base and of similar structure. The design of the solution to this 
issue lies in two complementary approaches. In the first case, 
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additional variable, which determines the version of the 
object, is introduced in classes. If the variable is introduced at 
the beginning of the declaration, it will be present even in case 
of trimming. Another method is using RunTime Type 
Information of the given language and in the event of 
transferring indicators, it is possible to verify their relevance. 
 
D. Character Buffer Overflow and Underflow 
Character buffer overflow and underflow is a combination 
of a buffer overflow with a timing attack when character 
buffers are used for functions that process files or shader 
functions for saving the name of the file of a shader, and these 
buffers are often controlled by a vulnerable code, or directly 
by a code trying to penetrate it. Vulnerable code can be 
Javascript, which runs under the web browser or in 
independent environment, such as V8, and which is used as a 
3D interface of WebGL. Because initial validation of strings is 
performed during transferring names from the user code into 
the WebGL interface and then to components responsible for 
processing requests, there is an interval between the initial 
validation and the finish of copying into the buffer. Such 
buffer is controlled by a responsible component. Penetrating 
code, which is running within the original Javascript and 
which has access to the source string, can then attempt to 
change the content to a shorter or longer string which contains 
malicious code or other data specific for the object containing 
the target buffer. If the code is loaded within this interval, the 
vulnerable function then rewrites the content not only of the 
target buffer, but also the rest remaining part of the object. 
 
E.  Invalid Indicator  
Invalid indicators are an important calls of errors, 
significance of which ranges from the option to cause an 
application or a service to crash, i.e. a DOS type attack, to 
forcing a run of a malicious code. The simplest type of an 
invalid indicator is a zero indicator, which links to a memory 
on the 0 address. This memory is not labelled as invalid on 
common platforms (IA 32/IA 64 or ARM). In order to detect 
common errors in programs, first 64kB of virtual memory are 
labelled as inaccessible and thus when attempting to 
dereference the zero indicator, an exception is thrown by a 
memory controller of the processor. Such exception typically 
terminates the process of the code does not filter this 
exception and does not attempt to continue. The most common 
reason for the existence of a zero indicator of the failure of 
memory allocation, or the attempt to extend the allocated array 










Vulnerable code rewrites the original indicator with a new 
one, which is returned by the standard realloc function. The 
problem is that if allocation of new memory fails, a zero 
indicator is returned and an error indicator and the original 
allocation are kept. However, in that moment the indicator of 
the original memory is lost and thus a memory leak is caused, 
but when attempting to use such indicator, an exception is 
thrown and the application crashes. 
The following demonstration shows one possibility how to 






char *string2 = Realloc(string,new_size); 
if(!string2){return;} /*or throw 
exception*/ 




The second class of invalid indicators is non-zero indicators. 
One of the sources of such indicators are variables, which 
were not initialized on the correct, or rather known, value like 
the zero indicators. Another cause is handling the value of 
indicators incorrectly (e.g. indicator arithmetic without proper 
control of interventions). This security flaw is more 
dangerous, as the indicator does not have to link into virtual 
space not accessible for the application (it is not allocated or it 
belongs into the core mode) and in case an attack code can 
ensure allocation in target address space or somehow affect 
the indicator, it is then possible to ensure the performance of a 
malicious code with rights of the given process or a service. 
 
F. Use-after-free  
Use-after-free is one option of an invalid indicator, in which 
the base of this error is vacating an object and subsequent 
deallocation from memory, and afterwards an attempt to call a 
method of this object or an access to a variable in it happens, 
while the memory previously occupied by the object is already 
allocated to a new object or it is being used by the still existing 
object. Such error often occurs when of the variables linking 
to this object does not reset to zero or when a new indicator 
was not saved for some reason. The result is then often crash 
of the code, as there is no executable code present in that 
location at that moment or the function execution is started on 
a random place. It is cause by not executing the prologue of a 
function, when the environment including the buffer settings 
for the given function is set. In less frequent cases, the whole 
function including the prologue is being executed, but when 
attempting to access the input parameters, random values, or 
zeros if the page was set to zero by the system, will be loaded 
and a failure occurs. Especially with a C++ object, in which 
the first parameter includes the indicator of the beginning of 
an object, then a zero indicator is not valid and no code is 
ready for such indicator. In both cases, the application fails 
and denial-of-service occurs. However, if the memory 
contains data from the penetration code, the content is 
executed in the given user context and for the components 
running with higher rights, e.g. drivers, it is a successful 
privilege escalation. 
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This flaw can easily be abused in Javascript, as it is a 




This vulnerability belongs among less serious flaws, as it 
cannot force execution of another code in most cases. It is a 
significant memory leak in the GPU driver, which is not 
administering the memory used for graphic sources correctly, 
and for module in core mode, it primarily concerns dynamic 
buffers used for allocation and repair pages for data intended 
to be loaded to the GPU. Although the memory for buffers in 
core mode should be labeled as pageable, it is not a required 
feature and a vulnerable driver can cause exhaustion of 
unpageable memory under allocation request of the malicious 
code and thus cause the instability and rare failures of drivers 
and services using said memory. 
 
H. Malformed input data 
In the context of interface for 3D graphics, data input for 
pipeline is one of the most important inputs. Each buffer 
containing data of peaks must be in accordance with pre-
specified format, which defines the order of variables, their 
type and size, and sometimes how they are used. Main 
deviations are often determined by an initial validation, 
executed by the runtime of the graphic interface, and their 
processing is terminated. However, some anomalies cannot be 
revealed this way. It is mostly incorrect values (e.g. abnormal 
FP) or structures declared higher than in the buffer. 
Alternative attack is then the timing attack, when the interval 
between compilation of input and transfer of data to the driver 
for processing is used. An attempt to process data behind the 
border of the buffer and subsequent rewrite of internal 
structures can occur in the driver itself, which is similar to 
using buffer overflow. The extent of such flaw can range from 




The investigated area of 3D graphic interface and the issue 
of it being attacked from the outside is very important topic in 
operating systems’ security. We based our investigation on the 
principles of WDDM driver architecture and DirectX 
interface, which uses this architecture. It was discovered that 
majority of functions and services within DirectX is 
implemented in drivers from graphic cards. Therefore, the 
main burden, from the viewpoint of implementing security 
measures, lies on their programmers. Another important 
finding is the extent of threat of important functions for 
working with the pipeline. These functions use user defined 
data or various buffers, including basic strings, for access.  
Various methods of penetration, which could be used 
against the interfaces and drivers implementing these 
interfaces were analyzed. Several various penetrations were 
identified and possible countermeasures appropriate for 
graphic interfaces were suggested. The significance of this 
paper is in its focus on identifying new methods of penetration 
into the system via various graphic interfaces and in 
suggesting of possible countermeasures considering their 
implementation on graphic cards, which can help 
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